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Herbert A. Davidson's Alfarabi, Avicenna,
and Averroes on Intellect:
A Critical Review
Richard C. Taylor

This is a rich work on the complex and difficult problem of the
intellect in the three major thinkers of the Medieval Islamic
philosophical tradition. 1 Its focus is the intellect, and in particular the efforts of philosophers of the Medieval Islamic, Christian
or Jewish traditions to understand both Aristotle and the nature
of intellect. Nothing of comparable breadth or depth and quality
of analysis and argument exists on this topic today. In a careful
and measured way it exposes arguments and complicated texts.
It also contains valuable resumes and summaries of its findings.
This is very welcome in a book which, because of its subject
matter, demands much of the reader.
Davidson's years of thoughtful reflection on his topic are
clearly evident as he systematically determines which Greek,
Arabic, Hebrew and Latin texts are required for a comprehensive
treatment of intellect in the Medieval Islamic philosophical
tradition. After a brief introduction, he moves directly into the
sources of the Greek and Arabic traditions. Central interpretive
notions and terms in Aristotle, Theophrastus, Alexander,
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Herbert A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on
Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and
Theories of Human Intellect (Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992). $55.00.
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Themistius. and Plotinus are spelled out with a view to the
pivotal roles they will later be seen to play in the development
of Islamic thought. Al-Kindi's philosophy and some central texts
of the Plotiniana Arabica (particularly the pseudo-Aristotelian
Theology of Aristotle), as well as the Arabic treatise on the soul
attributed to Porphyry, are also discussed as elements which
influenced later developments.
The chapter on al-Farabi lucidly exposes three different
positions on intellect taken in different works. Al-Madfna
al-Faaita and Al-Siyasa al-Madaniyya, writes Davidson, "assign
the active intellect functions related solely to the actualization of
the human intellect" (47) and see it as the lowest in a hierarchy
of ten intelligences emanating from the First Cause. It is the
intellect proximate to the sublunar realm which, by way of
emanations of principles, assists the human mind as it moves
from material (passive) intellect, to actual intellect, and then to
acquired intellect. At the highest human stage, the acquired
intellect can attain happiness and immortality by conjunction with
the active intellect. When the two are conjoined, prophecy can
come about thanks to the influence of the active intellect upon
the human imaginative faculty: a person of low intellectual
understanding comes to have in "the imagination knowledge of
present and future events and figurative depiction of theoretical
truths," while a person of acquired intellect has a perfected
intellect and is a philosopher-prophet. "When a philosopher-prophet possesses certain gifts of leadership, he becomes a philosopher-king as well" (63). In The Philosophy of Aristotle, Davidson notes, al-Farabi provides less detail on the nature and role of
the active intellect but clearly provides it with a dual role: it
prompts human intellectual development with intelligibles
principles for both the theoretical and practical intellectual
powers; and it is the final cause for human perfection which is
achieved only "when the human intellect arrives 'as close as
possible to' the active intellect" (64). What is clearly different,
however, concerns the transcendent source of the sublunar
species . In his Risala ft a/J1Aql, al-Farabi takes a different
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position, holding not only that the active intellect emanates "the
natural forms of individual sub lunar objects" but also that it
continues to play a role in human intellectual development, now
by moving potential concepts to actuality for human grasp.
Finally, Davidson examines the reports of al-Farabi 's lost
Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics in which he purportedly
abandoned the position that the active intellect could conjoin with
human beings and also abandoned belief in immortality. Davidson neatly sketches the differing positions of al-Farabi. positions
from which Avicenna and others will draw in the formulation of
their own views on these matters.
Chapter 4 presents the arguments and positions of
Avicenna. His work came to dominate much of the philosophical
discussion in Medieval Islam and its influence is still manifest in
philosophical and theological thinking in modern Iranian schools .
In cosmology Avicenna follows the lead of al-Farabi in adhering
to an emanative hierarchy but with the difference that the
procession of intelligences is taken to involve the engendering of
an intellect, a body and a soul at each level down to the active
intellect, which itself has causal responsibility for the sublunar
realm. Davidson correctly remarks that al-Farabi was not the
only likely source for Avicenna who had studied the Plotinian
Theology of Aristotle: "Avicenna could have arrived at his
account of the active intellect's functions by combining in the
active intellect functions that Plotinus distributed between the
Neoplatonic cosmic Intellect and cosmic Soul" (82). He also
reminds his readers that, "Although Avicenna's universe may
strike a modern reader as even more bizarre than Aristotle's, it
is, like Aristotle's, a carefully argued scientific hypothesis for
explaining observed phenomena" (83). But what is perhaps most
valuable is Davidson's discussion of active intellect and human
thought: the active intellect is now held to be the source of both
concepts and primary propositions of human thought or science.
Davidson valuably explicates the terminology of Avicenna on the
levels of human intellectual development and shows how far his
arguments have moved from Aristotle's understanding of the role

92

Richard C. Taylor

of imagination and mind in grasping things of the sensible realm.
For Avicenna, "Language to the effect that man abstracts thought
or that the light of the active intellect transforms potential
thoughts into actual thoughts is ... not to be taken literally, for
the actual thoughts in fact come from the emanation of the active
intellect" (94). Such thoughts come about in the human rational
soul by way of human cogitative efforts at self-preparation (i.e. ,
study) by the application of differentiating imaginative powers to
the emanations of the separate active intellect. The rational and
immortal soul must be simple, self-subsistent, incorporeal and
intelligible insofar as it is receptive of indivisible intelligible
thoughts. (In this Avicenna seems to be influenced by arguments
from Proclus.) While it can attain conjunction with the actiye
intellect in three ways, in "quotidian conjunction with the active
intellect, in permanent conjunction with the active intellect, and
in thought having the active intellect itself or other incorporeal
beings as an object," nevertheless "Avicenna-like Alfarabi in
his account of conjunction-envisages no genuinely mystical or
ecstatic experience" ( 105). Conjunction which results in prophecy is intellectual (involving ~ads, insight), or imaginative, or
both. The first "consists in receiving the emanation of the active
intellect without recourse to the cogitative faculty, the faculty
identical with the compositive imagination," while "the man
endowed with both categories of prophecy utilizes his figurative
recasting of theoretical truths to instruct the masses" (120). With
respect to eschatology, immortal souls determine for themselves
what awaits them in the afterlife by their intellectual achievements or lack thereof in the sublunar realm. An intellectual
wealth is the earned reward of those of intellectual achievement
in bodily life, but a dull emptiness awaits those with no awareness of intellectual life while in the body.
Chapter 5 is entitled, "Reverberations of the Theories of
Alfarabi and Avicenna," and deals with al-Ghazali, Ibn Baja, lbn
Tufail, Abu'l-Barakat and Suhrawardi of the Islamic tradition,
Judah Hallevi, Abraham lbn Daud and Moses Maimonides of the
Jewish tradition, and also Latin Scholastic thought. The analyses
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are brief but lucid and valuable accounts of the doctrines of these
thinkers. But what deserves special mention is Davidson's critical
exposition of the thought of al-Ghazali as a follower of Avicenna
(in accord with remarks to that effect by Averroes). After a
lengthy analysis of the Mishkat al-Anwar, and especially the
meaning of its symbolism. Davidson concludes that, "Although
Ghazali had. at one stage, drawn up a thoroughgoing critique of
Avicenna's philosophy, his Mishkat al-Anwar reproduces much
of Avicenna's system, disguised in allusive language" (218).
This surprising view has also been argued by Richard M. Frank
in his 1992 monograph, Creation and the Cosmic System:
al-Ghazali and Avicenna. Frank concludes with the remark:
It has long been recognized that while al-Ghazali
rejected some major theses of the Avicennian
system he appropriated others. What we have
seen on a closer examination of what he has to
say concerning God's relation to the cosmos as
its creator, however, reveals that from a theological standpoint most of the theses which he
rejected are relatively tame and inconsequential
compared to some of those in which he follows
the philosopher.2
The implications of this research for understanding the nature of
Islam as a religion in the thought of al-Ghazali. arguably Islam's
greatest theologian, are of more than passing academic interest.
If al-Ghazali did indeed come to adopt the cosmological views of
Avicenna, it may well follow in a consistent way that he also

1

Creation and the Cosmic System: Al-Ghazali and Avicenna
(Heidelberg, 1992), p . 86. It is beyond the bounds of this article
to examine in detail the evidence and the theses put forward by
Davidson and Frank, but the latter's work is critically reviewed
by M . E. Marmura in "Ghazalian Causes and Intermediaries,"
Journal of the American Oriental Society 115 (1995): 89-100.
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covertly gave serious consideration to adopting the controversial
understanding of the nature of religion commonly found in the
philosophers . Further research on this topic may well point to an
implicit but surprising and unexpectedly deep affinity between
al-Ghazali and Averroes on religion and its role in society and
in the life of the individual. The topic needs to be explored in its
own right in a comprehensive study, something which might well
prove to have serious implications for the understanding of
contemporary Islamic religious thought and its historical
foundations in the theology of al-Ghazali.
Chapters 6-8 are devoted to Averroes and his evolving
understanding of the nature and activities of the active intellect
and the material intellect. Davidson first outlines the historical
development of the thought of Averroes from his being a
follower of Avicenna to the construction of his own philosophy
as an attempt to recapture the truth in Aristotle. Averroes moves
from dependence on Avicenna to dependence upon the Greek
commentators or lbn Baja until the complexity of the problems
he must address leads him back to Aristotle himself. It is there
that he tries to find the keys to unlock aporiai, some as old as
Aristotle, others generated in the Greek Aristotelian tradition or
in the tradition of Islamic Aristotelians. Davidson moves
carefully through the various receilsions of the Epitome of the
Metaphysics and finds interpolation there to be doctrinally
consonant with the Middle and Long Commentaries on the
Metaphysics as well as the Taha.fut al-Taha.fut. Abandoning the
emanative (or creative) scheme of al-Farabi and Avicenna,
Averroes takes refuge in a conception of the First Cause as final
cause to a considerable degree analogous to the One's finality in
Plotinus. For Averroes, "each intelligence possesses a stratum of
existence in its own right," a stratum different but not altogether
unlike that of emanated Intellect in its first moment as Being in
the philosophy of Plotinus. Even more in accord with the
account of Plotinus, each intelligence in its "underlying stratum
eternally turns its mental gaze upon the unitary First Cause, and
the conception of the First Cause which each thereby receives
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endows it with the measure of perfection befitting its rank in the
cosmic hierarchy" (256). For the mature Averroes , the First
Cause- "the intelligence moving the outermost sphere" -is not
an efficient or active emanative cause of these intelligences
except equivocally. Rather, it is a final and formal cause of the
form and actuality in the being of the intelligences through those
intelligences' self-determination: "The intelligence thus receives
its form and its full measure of existence through its concept of
the First Cause" (354). As for the active intellect in its relation
to the origination of natural forms in the world. it "plays no
role , and its function accordingly shrinks back to what Aristotle
established in the De Anima, to the actualization of the potential
human intellect'' (257).
Devoted to the material intellect and to the active
intellect in human thought, chapters 7 and 8 describe in detail the
different positions Averroes took and how he finally "moved not
toward what the consensus of modern scholarship would take to
be the historically correct interpretation of Aristotle [on the
material intellect] but in the opposite direction" (298) . In setting
forth Averroes' views on the topic, Davidson draws on seven
important works of Averroes including his three commentaries
on the De Anima (epitome, middle, and long), the Epistle on the
Possibility of Conjunction, two short works, and sections of his
commentary on Alexander's De lntellectu . According to Davidson, the Middle Commentary on the De Anima contains an
excursus from a later period , a thesis which he admits lacks
manuscript evidence (276) (such evidence is available in the case
of the Epitome of the De Anima) and which is in direct opposition to the views of Alfred Ivry, editor of the recently published
critical edition of Averroes' work. Ivry argues for his position
in the introduction to his edition of the Arabic text' and also in

3

Averroes' Middle Commentary on Aristotle's de Anima (Cairo,
1994), English pp . 10-11 .
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"Averroes' Middle and Long Commentaries on the De anima. "4
Davidson's attractive thesis solves a number of interpretive
problems and allows one to see a line of development in
Averroes ' thought. Ivry , in working to make coherent sense of
the same texts, argues for the unorthodox thesis that the Middle
Commentary is posterior to the Long Commentary. Both theses
are controversial, difficult to establish definitively, and currently
being argued in the literature. Still, Ivry and Davidson do agree
in seeing the Long Commentary as containing Averroes' most
comprehensive account of the material intellect. For Davidson,
Averroes takes this separate intellectual substance as what all
human beings share although, in virtue of the particular cogitative powers in each person, "each still owns his personal ,
individual actual thoughts , and thoughts are not shared" (290).
But Davidson should have strongly emphasized that the term
'thought' is equivocal. For Averroes, the intelligibles-each of
which is unique-cannot exist in individuals without becoming
particularized and losing their ability to be the referents of
individual 'thought' or cogitation; so it must be the case that
what exist in individuals are images which refer to the intelligibles in the material intellect. Rather than follow Avicenna, for
whom worldly perceptions and images are only accidentally
related to knowledge of concepts and principles, Averroes
follows Aristotle more closely by insisting that our knowledge be
of things in the world in some significant sense. For Averroes
the cogitative power functions much as it does in Avicenna,
namely as a discriminating power actively composing images
from sense prior to the grasp of intelligibles and actively
utilizing intelligibles received from the intellect in the formation
4

Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 5 (1995): 75-92. Also see
"Averroes ' Middle Commentary on the De Anima ," in Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy: Proceedings of
the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy
(S.l.E.P.M.), ed . Reijo Tyorinoja et alii (Helsinki, 1990), vol.
3, pp . 79- 86 .
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of propositions. The human imaginative faculty, characterized as
rational or intellectual, is the cogitative power. But for Averroes,
in contrast to Avicenna, this power presents images to the
material intellect and the agent intellect, and "the active intellect
illuminates both the material intellect and images in the imaginative faculty of the soul; and the result is actual human abstract
thought, that is, concepts" (319). Of course, abstract thoughts
and concepts, the intelligibles, cannot exist as such in the
individual human soul (a 'this') without being particularized.
Rather. what exist in the bodily rational power are images, the
referents of which are in the separate material intellect as
required epistemologically by the unity of science. This ability
to summon the agent to action and knowledge in ourselves is a
function of our use and exercise of this faculty. The cogitative
power of individual human beings is also the source of will and
voluntary action on the part of the individual (cf. 320). In
discussing this, Davidson writes: "The question that cries out for
an answer, namely, how a transient human soul can induce the
eternal active intellect and eternal material intellect to do its
bidding, is never addressed." This is an important point, but the
answer is already implicit in the Aristotelian thought of Averroes. At Posterior Analytics 2. 19. 100a14 Aristotle remarks that
the soul is constituted to be able to do this. That is, given the
Aristotelian tradition's commitment to epistemological realism
and essentialism, little more can be said on this question other
than that there is a natural connection between the bodily human
rational power and the separate material and agent intellects, a
connection which enables human beings to know. By way of the
human power of imagination, that connection makes rationality
and thought actual in human individuals thanks to their cogitative
powers, even if thought and intelligence can only be equivocally
.predicated of particular humans and· the separate material and
agent intellects. As a consequence, human thought itself is
equivocal: "Arguments showing human thought to be eternal
have in view human thought belonging to the material intellect,
whereas arguments showing it to be generated-des-tructible and
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individual have in view human thought insofar as it belongs to
the imaginative faculty of an individual man" (292).
Davidson rightly connects with this Averroes' doctrine
of the hierarchy of separate intellects which are responsible for
the movement of the heavens. However, he does not emphasize
how pleased Averroes was to be able to make the connection. In
the Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle5 and in his
Long Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle6 Averroes
himself claims that the doctrine of the separate material intellect
establishes key principles, principles which are the foundation for
the science of metaphysics and essential to understanding the
hierarchy of separate intellects leading up to the First Form,
God. According to Averroes, it is this discovery of a non-material kind of potentiality in the science of the soul which
makes it possible to understand the hierarchy and diversity of
separate intelligences or celestial intellects. That is to say,
philosophical psychology's epistemological argument for the
unity of science proves the necessity of the existence of the
non-corporeal material intellect as intellect and as potency; it
thereby makes possible the science of metaphysics; and consequently it aids in the understanding of the plurality and hierarchy
of separate intellects.
Given Averroes' doctrine of the unity of human thought
in the material intellect, there are obvious implications for his
mature understanding of the role of the active intellect. of the
possibility of personal immortality, and of the nature of prophe5

Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libras, ed.
F. Stuart Crawford (Cambridge, 1953) p. 5 and also p. 410
where he writes, "If it were not for this genus of beings which
we know in the science of the soul, we could not understand
multiplicity in separate things, to the extent that, unless we know
here the nature of the intellect, we cannot know that the separate
moving powers ought to be intellects" (my translation).
6
Tafsfr ft ma bafid at-Tabifia, ed. M. Bouyges, S.J., 2d ed.,
(Beirut, 1973), vol. 3, pp. 1593-94, 1600, 1612-13.
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cy. The possibility of some sort of conjunction of human beings
with the active intellect was dear to his philosophical tradition
and dear to Averroes. But, as Davidson notes, Averroes' mature
doctrine of the material intellect allows for "only a very attenuated conjunction of the active intellect with the human soul" (334).
The actual rationality of a particular human soul is due to its
intimate connection , with the separate material intellect; the
actuality of the separate material intellect as intellect is due to its
being affected and actualized by the separated active intellect;
hence, human bodily thinking and rationality are due to a
mediated conjunction with the active intellect. While Averroes
expresses his understanding of this conjunction with apparent
enthusiasm, Davidson is right to observe that "the Long Commentary . . . does not, and could not, ever expressly say that the
active intellect becomes the direct object of human consciousness" (335) . Moreover, given his views on the nature of
particular human beings and particular human powers, and given
the merely equivocal way in which, according to Averroes,
rationality can be predicated of humans in whom images of
intelligibles and not intelligibles themselves can exist, it is
obvious that for Averroes the human self is a particular material
composite which is a 'this .' That the human soul is immortal is
true, but this should not be understood as pertaining to the
particular human individual. Rather, what is immortal is human
soul as species. 7
These intertwined doctrines lead to views which are
almost inevitable, given the developmental path of intellectualist
and necessitarian elements in the history of the Aristotelian
philosophical tradition in Islamic lands. Davidson clearly points

7

Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libras, ed.
F. Stuart Crawford, pp. 408-9. Also see, Richard C. Taylor,
'"The Future Life' and Averroes's Long Commentary on the De
Anima of Aristotle," pp .272-73 and 277, in Averroes and the
Enlightenment, ed. Mourad Wahba and Mona Abousenna
(Buffalo , N. Y. , 1996), pp. 263-77 .
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out the impact on the doctrine of prophecy which is consequent
upon the naturalistic account of perishable particular human souls
given by Averroes.
He is asserting that the phenomena we are
considering, including revelation and prophecy,
give no reliable information about matters
belonging to the domain of science, not even by
furnishing the uneducated with a figurative
representation of theoretical truths. . . . Revelation as well as the written record of revealed
knowledge thus contribute nothing to the soul's
well-being. (344)
Knowledge and truth essentially concern scientific matters ,
demonstration, and the intellect, while in their essence theological dialectic and emotive rhetoric concern lower matters and
lower parts of the soul. The 'truth' of these latter two consists in
the value they have in contributing to human well-being and to
the development of human perfection and happiness. But real
perfection and happiness involve the development of the intellect
to the extent that this is possible in this life. Consequently, the
'truth' or value of religion is practical, pragmatic, and derivative
in that religion contributes to human moral and political formation. The implication. then, is that religion, 'revelation,' and
other things arising from the imaginative powers such as dreams,
have no truth or value in their own right and are not necessarily
a proper guide to human happiness. Davidson does not draw out
all the implications of such an understanding of Averroes and the
tradition reaching back to al-Ghazali and Avicenna. but he quite
properly addresses the discrepancy between Averroes' philosophical accounts and his accounts in popular works such as the
Tahilfut al-tahilfut. For the philosopher, he writes, "The term
prophet would . . . mean nothing more than the human author
of Scripture; and the term revelation would mean a high level of
philosophic knowledge" (351). If this is the correct way to read
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Averroes, and it does seem to be that, then recent attempts to
place Averroes in the vanguard of 'enlightenment' thinkers in
Islamic nations 8 amount to little more than attempting to send a
wolf in sheep's clothing into the flock. While Averroes is
admirable for his commitment to truth and rationality, his work
carries deep inside it a complete disavowal of the truth of the
proposition which believing Muslims claim to be the essence of
their faith in Islam: the shahada9 as a statement of truth and not
mere emotion or rhetoric . This is not to say that Averroes was
anti-religious, for he held that religious guidance is appropriate
for the sake of moral and intellectual character formation for
certain classes of people and, certainly, for each person in
growing from child to adult. In a sense, he was no more and no
less atheist or theist than were the Greek Stoics, for he did hold
to the existence of a First Cause of the existence of all things
(albeit by final and formal causality, not efficient causality).
Nevertheless, Thomas Aquinas-with his view that some truths
of faith transcend the intellect and are revealed by a personal
deity who acts on the world and gives grace to human souls
through efficient causality-is vastly more sympathetic to religion
as a source of truth and real wisdom. Averroes' thought is

8

This seems to be the purpose behind many (but ~ot all) of the
essays in Averroes and the Enlightenment cited in the previous
note. For a study of the ways in which the thought of Averroes
has been interpreted and used in modern times , see Anke von
Kiigelgen, Averroes und die arabische Moderne: Ansiitze zu einer
Neubegrundung des Rationalismus im Islam (Leiden, New York,
Cologne, 1994).
9
"There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His messenger."
This is the first of the Five Pillars of Islam. "The shahada is
essential . . . and without it no-one can consider himself a
Muslim in any sense." Cyril Glasse, The Concise Encyclopedia
of Islam (San Francisco and London, 1989) p. 132A.
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ultimately deeply anti-Islamic in its denial of the literal truth of
religious propositions expressing the essence of Islam. 10
There is nothing disappointing in Davidson's insightful
tome, although it can be argued that he is not quite on the mark
when he writes that
in order to reapproach Aristotle, Averroes
should have dropped the experimental position
[i.e., that found in the portion of the Middle
Commentary on the De Anima which Davidson
postulates as an excursus to the main text],
returned to his original naturalistic construction
of the material intellect, and incorporated the
original construction into his new, hard-won
naturalistic account of biological processes. He
should have maintained that human souls with
their disposition for thought, called material
intellect, are latent in the matter of the sublunar
world and are drawn forth from matter by
soul-heat. (355)
Such a position, however, is precluded by the requirements of
Aristotelian epistemology and metaphysics. Averroes insists that
intelligibles cannot exist as such in individuals. Individuals are
'thises' or particulars. There is only one intelligible of each
species and only one intelligible would be particularized by the

1

°For a brief comparison of these thinkers as well as al-Ghazali
and Augustine, see Richard C. Taylor, "Faith and Reason,
Religion and Philosophy: Four Views from Medieval Islam and
Christianity" in Philosophy and the God of Abraham: In Memory
of James A. Weisheipl, O.P., ed. R. James Long (Toronto:
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1991), pp . 217-3 3.
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material and corporeal subject into which it would be
received. 11 That is, for there to be knowledge-the grasp of the
intelligible which is not a 'this' or a particular-it is necessary
that this intelligible exist in a single and separate immaterial
intellect which does not have the nature of a corporeal particular,
according to Averroes.
Although Davidson's book is an invaluable contribution
to our understanding of the doctrine of the intellect in Medieval
thought-both because it provides a large picture and because it
provides details-work remains to be done in a number of areas.
One worthy of brief mention is the question of the doctrine of
cogitation which is an essential part of Averroes' mature
understanding of the human mind. The doctrine of the bodily
human cogitative faculty is spelled out more clearly in his Long
Commentary on the De Anima than in any of his other works.
There the term cogitatio and related forms such as cogitare,
virtus cogitativa, cogitabile, cogitans, and the like, appear at
least seventeen times in the primary Arabic text of Aristotle's De
Anima used by Averroes as we have that text in Latin. These
terms, however, correspond to a wide variety of original Greek
terms, among them logistikos, logismos, and related forms,
dianoeomai and related forms doxa, bouleutikos, and related
forms, and dianoia. The primary Arabic translation of the De
Anima used by Averroes in his Long Commentary on the De
Anima is no longer extant, but scholarship on the Medieval
translations of the lost Arabic De Anima from Arabic into Latin

11

"The reason why that nature is something which discerns and
knows while prime matter neither knows nor discerns, is because
prime matter receives different forms. namely individual and
particular forms, while this [nature] receives universal forms.
From this it is apparent that this nature is not a this nor a body
nor a power in a body. " Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis
De Anima Libros, ed. F. Stuart Crawford, p. 388 (my translation). See pp. 385-89 and also pp. 393 and 402-3.
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and into Hebrew 12 seems to indicate that the version selected
for use by Averroes was different from its original Arabic
translation. His preferred version appears to have been corrupt
in ways that suggest systematic and intentional contamination by
the substitution of the vocabulary of cogitation for an originally
wider array of Arabic terms which were more in accord with the
original Greek. Thus, the doctrine of cogitation in the De Anima
found in Averroes' Long Commentary on the De Anima-that is,
the grouping together of many human rational activities under a
single set of terms from the same etymological root, rational
activities which take place in the body by means of discursive
thinking-was not found as such in Aristotle or in the original
Arabic translations. 13
In sum, Davidson's excellent contribution to the study of
the understanding of intellect in the Middle Ages belongs not
only in every research library but also in the personal libraries
of all serious students of Medieval philosophical and religious
thought. No more reliable and insightful book-length study of the
philosophy of mind in al-Farabi, Avicenna and Averroes and

12

Aristotle 's 'De Anima' Translated into Hebrew by Zerahyah
Ben Isaac Ben Shealtiel Hen: A Critical Edition with an Introduction and Index, ed. Gerrit Bos (Leiden, New York, and
Cologne, 1994).
13
The corresponding Arabic texts can be show to have ftkr and
related terms from the same root. This was discussed in my
paper "Remarks on Cogitatio in Averroes' Commentarium
Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libras, " presented at the fourth
Symposium Averroicum at Cologne on September 8, 1996. This
will be published in the forthcoming Proceedings of that
symposium.
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their influence on philosophical thought in the Islamic . Christian,
and Jewish intellectual traditions is available today. 14

Marquette University

14

1 benefited from valuable stylistic suggestions on this piece
from my colleague Michael W reen for which I am grateful.

